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Abstract
In this paper we first analyse Leggett and Garg’s argument to the
effect that macroscopic realism contradicts quantum mechanics. After
making explicit all the assumptions in Leggett and Garg’s reasoning,
we argue against the plausibility of their auxiliary assumption of non-
invasive measurability, using Bell’s construction of stochastic pilot-
wave theories as a counterexample. Violations of the Leggett–Garg
inequality thus do not provide a good argument against macrorealism
per se. We then apply Dzhafarov and Kujala’s analysis of contextu-
ality in the presence of signalling to the case of the Leggett–Garg in-
equalities, with rather surprising results. An analogy with pilot-wave
theory again helps to clarify the situation.
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1 Introduction
Leggett and Garg (1985) establish a contradiction between quantum mechan-
ics and what they call the assumptions of ‘macroscopic realism’ and ‘non-
invasive measurability on the macroscopic scale’, using the example of macro-
scopic quantum tunnelling in SQUIDs previously discussed by Chakravarty
and Leggett (1984).
In this paper, we shall first of all, in Section 2, review Leggett and Garg’s
argument, making more explicit the assumptions needed to establish their
result. In particular, we shall distinguish two components in the assump-
tion of non-invasive measurability (see also Leggett (2002)): (a) that one
can always perform measurements that reveal the pre-existing value of the
macroscopic flux (we shall call this ‘faithful measurability’), and (b) that one
can always perform measurements of the macroscopic magnetic flux that do
not alter the subsequent dynamics of the system (for this we shall use Leggett
and Garg’s own term of ‘non-invasive measurability’). The contradiction is
between quantum mechanics on the one hand and the assumptions of macro-
scopic realism and simultaneously faithful and non-invasive measurability on
the other hand.
While Leggett and Garg believe that macroscopic realism plausibly implies
(simultaneously faithful and) non-invasive measurability, so that violation of
their inequality in fact rules out macroscopic realism, we point out in Sec-
tion 3 that models of the quantum mechanical predictions satisfying both
macroscopic realism and faithful measurability are easy to construct, along
the lines of Bell’s (1986) stochastic pilot-wave theories, but that these natu-
rally violate non-invasive measurability. Thus, while violation of the Leggett–
Garg inequality may indeed be a signature of quantum behaviour on a macro-
scopic scale, it is not sufficient to rule out macroscopic realism as such.
Section 4 then analyses the violation of the Leggett–Garg inequality in terms
of the discussion by Dzhafarov and Kujala (2014a,b) of contextuality in the
presence of temporal signalling (i.e. for the case in which performing a mea-
surement affects the distribution of results of a later measurement). Sur-
prisingly, in the case considered by Leggett and Garg, namely with a pure
initial state, the violation of the Leggett–Garg inequality turns out not to
be sufficient for contextuality in the sense of Dzhafarov and Kujala, because
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of the amount of signalling present. Instead, if the initial state is maximally
mixed, the situation is reversed: no temporal signalling is possible and the
violation is entirely described in terms of contextuality.
Our final Section 5 again invokes pilot-wave theory to provide a helpful anal-
ogy for explaining the discrepancy between the pure and mixed cases. The
disanalogy, however, remains in the case of ‘Schro¨dinger’s SQUID’.1
2 The Leggett–Garg inequalities
The example of macroscopic quantum tunnelling used by Leggett and Garg
(1985) is essentially the familiar one of quantum tunnelling in a symmetric
double potential well: for finite barrier height the ground state energy is
split into E± ∆E
2
, the degeneracy between the symmetric and anti-symmetric
states |ψS〉 and |ψA〉 is lifted, and the system oscillates between the states
|ψR〉 :=
1√
2
(|ψA〉 − |ψS〉) and |ψL〉 :=
1√
2
(|ψA〉 + |ψS〉) localised in the two
wells:
|ψ(t)〉 = cos(∆E
2~
(t− t0))|ψR〉 − i sin(
∆E
2~
(t− t0))|ψL〉 . (1)
Setting Q := |ψR〉〈ψR| − |ψL〉〈ψL|, from elementary trigonometric identities
one can calculate the following quantum mechanical expectation values:
〈Q(t)〉 = cos(∆E
~
(t− t0)) (2)
(where the argument of Q refers to the time of measurement), and more
generally
〈Q(tj)Q(ti)〉 = cos(
∆E
~
(tj − ti)) (3)
(understood as the expectation value for the results of two measurements in
succession, with intervening collapse of the wave function2). Note for future
reference (we shall use this in footnote 6 below and especially in Section 4)
that (3) is independent of t0, so it remains the same if the initial state at
1For two other recent and very penetrating criticisms of Leggett and Garg (both par-
tially overlapping with the present discussion), see Kofler and Brukner (2013) and Maroney
and Timpson (in preparation).
2In the notation we introduce later, we shall be writing 〈Q(ti)〉 = 〈Q
i
i〉 and
〈Q(tj)Q(ti)〉 = 〈Q
ij
i Q
ij
j 〉.
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t = 0 is an arbitrary state of the form (1), e.g. |ψR〉 or |ψL〉, and consequently
also if it is an arbitrary mixture of such states.
Given that the system is a macroscopic magnetic flux, environmental effects
are unavoidable, and coherent behaviour such as the above is generally sup-
pressed. Chakravarty and Leggett (1984), however, show that in a certain
regime and on a certain time scale the oscillations are merely underdamped,
so that qualitatively the system behaves like the familiar case, and one has
indeed macroscopic quantum tunnelling.
Leggett and Garg now use this as a test case for (or rather against) com-
mon intuitions that a macroscopic system should always be in a macroscop-
ically well-defined state, and thus (if Q specifically refers to the macroscopic
magnetic flux in the SQUID) that Q should always have the value +1 or
−1, irrespective of measurement. A direct confirmation that the system is
in a non-trivial superposition (1) through a measurement of an observable
P (t) := |ψ(t)〉〈ψ(t)| is not in itself feasible, but Leggett and Garg point out
that, even if one is able to measure only the observable Q, one obtains a
contradiction with the predictions of quantum mechanics by considering se-
quential measurements at times t1, t2, t3, . . . (which, because of the non-trivial
dynamics (1), are effectively sequential measurements of non-commuting ob-
servables). More precisely, they argue that a contradiction follows under the
additional assumption (to be spelled out below) that Q can be measured
non-invasively — which they consider plausible given macroscopic realism.
Here are the details (as we see them). As mentioned, Leggett and Garg
assume what they call macroscopic realism, by which they explicitly mean
that the macroscopic quantity Q always has a definite value. Implicitly,
their assumption of macroscopic realism further includes the existence of a
(generally stochastic) evolution for Q so that all the probability distributions
ρ(Q1, Q2, Q3, . . .) (4)
are well-defined, where Qi is the random variable Q at time ti. It then follows
that various Bell inequalities are satisfied for the pairwise marginals derived
from (4), for instance
1 + 〈Q1Q2〉+ 〈Q2Q3〉+ 〈Q1Q3〉 ≥ 0 , (5)
which we shall refer to as ‘the Leggett–Garg inequality’, and which is one-half
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of the inequality by Suppes and Zanotti (1981),3
− 1 ≤ 〈Q1Q2〉+ 〈Q2Q3〉+ 〈Q1Q3〉 ≤
≤ 1 + 2min{〈Q1Q2〉, 〈Q2Q3〉, 〈Q1Q3〉} . (6)
The random variables Qj in (4) refer to the system as it evolves on its own,
with no measurements being performed. In order to consider also measure-
ments on the system, let us introduce new random variables Q...ijk...j , etc.,
representing the magnetic flux at the time tj for the case in which measure-
ments are carried out at the times . . . ti, tj , tk, . . .
Explicitly, Leggett and Garg now make the assumption of non-invasive mea-
surability on the macroscopic scale, which they define as follows: ‘It is possi-
ble, in principle, to determine the state of the system with arbitrarily small
perturbation on its subsequent dynamics’ (1985, p. 857). If one assumes that
there are measurements on the system that do not affect the system’s trajec-
tory in any way, then it is clear that the probabilities (4) equal the directly
observable probabilities
ρ(Q123...1 , Q
123...
2 , Q
123...
3 , . . .) , (7)
and that, in particular,
ρ(Qiji , Q
ij
j ) = ρ(Qi, Qj) , (8)
so one can test whether (5) is violated.
Leggett and Garg consider non-invasive measurability in this sense to be plau-
sible given macroscopic realism, and look at the example of ideal negative-
result experiments to substantiate this,4 citing the example of a two-slit ex-
periment in which one puts a (perfect) detector behind one slit only, and the
3Both inequalities (5) and (6) are a special case of the CHSH inequalities for the case in
which one pair of observables is equal (so that the expectation of their product is identically
1). However, while Leggett and Garg are interested in (5) as a necessary condition for the
existence of joint distribution (4), the main result in Suppes and Zanotti (1981) was the
first published proof (under the restriction of flat marginals) that a Bell-type inequality
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a joint probability distribution.
The necessity and sufficiency of the CHSH inequalities was established at the same time
by Fine (1982). Thanks to Ehtibar Dzhafarov for correspondence on these points.
4To the best of my knowledge, negative-result experiments in the context of quantum
mechanics were first considered by Schro¨dinger (1934, p. 519), as a criticism of the idea
that quantum measurements always involve the exchange of at least one quantum of action.
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detector does not fire. By extension, one might (ideally) check whether the
flux is in the right well by means of an interaction that vanishes everywhere
else. If the result is negative, one infers that the flux is in the left well, and by
macroscopic realism that it was so also immediately before the experiment,
and thus — so Leggett and Garg — that the experiment has not altered the
dynamics of the system.
We shall return to the plausibility of non-invasive measurability in Section 3
below. Suffice it to say now that this argument does not seem to establish the
assumption in full, in that it does not seem to establish that the system will
continue to evolve according to the original dynamics also in the future; but
it certainly establishes the plausibility of the more modest assumption that
it is possible to carry out faithful measurements at the macroscopic scale, in
the sense that it is possible to carry out a measurement of Qi such that the
corresponding result indeed equals the pre-existing value of Qi.
Accordingly, for the purposes of Section 3 it will be useful to distinguish
explicitly two components in Leggett and Garg’s non-invasive measurability,
namely that it is possible to perform a measurement that: (a) does not alter
the value of Q that is being measured (we shall call this ‘faithful measur-
ability’), and (b) does not alter the transition probabilities for the values
of Q at later times (for this we shall use Leggett and Garg’s original term
‘non-invasive measurability’).5
Assumption (a) that measurements of Q are faithful means that, for all
sequences of measurements at times . . . ti ≤ tj ≤ tk, . . ., the following identity
of random variables holds:
Q
...ijk...
j = Q
...ik...
j , (9)
and in particular that
Qii = Qi . (10)
Assumption (b) that measurements are non-invasive (in our more specific
sense) means that, for all sequences of measurements at times . . . ti ≤ tj ≤ tk
and for all values of the flux at times tp ≤ tq . . . ≤ tr, if tr > tk then
ρ(Q...ijkr |Q
...ijk
p , Q
...ijk
q , . . . ) = ρ(Q
...ij
r |Q
...ij
p , Q
...ij
q , . . .) , (11)
5More recently, Leggett (2002) has also been explicitly including both components in
the definition of non-invasive measurability.
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or equivalently (since tr > tk ≥ tj ≥ ti . . .), if tr > tk then
ρ(Q...ijkr |Q
...ijk
p , Q
...ijk
q , . . . ) = ρ(Qr|Qp, Qq, . . .) . (12)
It now obviously follows again that, given macroscopic realism, if one assumes
that measurements of Q are both faithful and non-invasive, one has
ρ(Q12...n1 , Q
12...n
2 , . . . , Q
12...n
n ) = ρ(Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn) (13)
for all n, as one can easily prove explicitly by induction from (10) and (11)
and the assumption that, for all sequences of measurements at times . . . ti ≤
tj ≤ tk, if tk > tj then Q
...ijk
j = Q
...ij
j (the identity of random variables does
not depend on whether any even later measurements are performed). In
particular, one has
ρ(Qiji , Q
ij
j ) = ρ(Qi, Qj) . (14)
This is all that is needed to test the Leggett–Garg inequality,6 which becomes
1 + 〈Q121 Q
12
2 〉+ 〈Q
23
2 Q
23
3 〉+ 〈Q
13
1 Q
13
3 〉 ≥ 0 . (15)
However, quantum mechanics predicts that the observable probabilities in
fact violate this inequality.
Indeed, substituting (3) into (15) yields
1 + cos(∆E
~
(t2 − t1)) + cos(
∆E
~
(t3 − t2)) + cos(
∆E
~
(t3 − t1)) ≥ 0 , (16)
and it is easy to show that (16) is violated, and maximally so, if one chooses7
∆E
~
(t3 − t2) =
∆E
~
(t2 − t1) =
2pi
3
, (17)
6Note there are two ways one might go about testing the Leggett–Garg inequality: (i)
by measuring the expectation values 〈Qiji Q
ij
j 〉 in three sets of experiments, one for each
pair (i, j), or (ii) by measuring the expectation value 〈Q131 Q
13
3 〉 in one set of experiments,
and the expectation values 〈Q123
1
Q123
2
〉 and 〈Q123
2
Q123
3
〉 in a second set of experiments.
The two procedures are equivalent as tests of (5) because 〈Q1231 Q
123
2 〉 = 〈Q
12
1 Q
12
2 〉 (no
effect of later measurements) and because 〈Q123
2
Q123
3
〉 = 〈Q23
2
Q23
3
〉 both according to
the hypothesis of macroscopic realism (and faithful and non-invasive measurability) and
according to quantum mechanics (because measuring Q at t1 leaves the system in the
equal-weight mixture of |ψR〉 and |ψL〉, and hence the quantum mechanical expectation
value 〈Q2Q3〉 is given by (3) whether or not the measurement at t1 is carried out). We
shall return to these two possible scenarios in footnote 17 at the end of Section 4.
7Writing (17) as 1 + cos(α) + cos(β) + cos(α+ β), stationarity with respect to both α
and β implies sin(α) = sin(β), i. e. α = pi − β mod (2pi) or α = β mod (2pi). In the first
case, (16) is saturated and thus never violated; in the second case, a simple minimisation
yields maximal violation for α = 2pi
3
.
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for which all three cosine terms equal −1
2
. The corrections to (3) in the
Chakravarty–Leggett model do not essentially affect this result, apart from
an adjustment in the effective oscillation frequency, and, indeed, also Leggett
and Garg choose the value 2pi
3
in order to violate (5).8
Such a violation correctly implies that at least one of macrorealism, faithful
measurability or non-invasive measurability fail (with the last two apparently
being plausible consequences of macrorealism).
3 Pilot-waves and invasive measurements
From the above, it would seem that the natural conclusion from the viola-
tion of the Leggett–Garg inequality is that macroscopic realism fails. We now
wish to argue that the weakest of the three assumptions needed to establish
Leggett and Garg’s result is that of non-invasive measurability. Indeed, we
shall point out that it is a familiar feature of a rather well-known family of
theories, satisfying both the assumptions of realism and of faithful measura-
bility, that non-invasive measurability should fail. The best-known example
of such a theory is de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave theory. In order to see this
we shall just need to recall a few basic features of the theory and look at
the elementary case of single-slit diffraction (or double-slit diffraction, as in
Leggett and Garg’s negative-result example).
As presented by de Broglie in October 1927 at the fifth Solvay conference
(de Broglie 1928), pilot-wave theory is a novel dynamics for systems of n
particles described in configuration space. Writing the Schro¨dinger wave
function as ψ = ReiS/~, the motion of the i-th particle is given by
1
mi
∇iS(x1, . . . ,xn) . (18)
Also, insofar as one may assume that measurement results are recorded in
some object’s position (a pointer, ink on paper, ultimately somewhere in the
brain) it follows that ordinary measurements of position are faithful.9 In this
sense, pilot-wave theory is a theory that satisfies with respect to position both
8We cannot reproduce Leggett and Garg’s equation (3), but it seems inessential to
deriving their results.
9The (non-trivial and generally non-faithful) measurement theory for observables other
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the assumption of realism (in that it always has a value and a well-defined
dynamics — in this case deterministic) and that of faithful measurability.
It is clear, at least qualitatively, that the theory predicts both interference
and diffraction phenomena. Indeed, around the nodes of the modulus R of
the wave function, the phase S will behave very irregularly, so one expects
that the particles will be driven away from regions of configuration space
where R is small. If one assumes additionally that particle positions are
initially distributed according to R2, one can show that this form of the
distribution is preserved over time (as de Broglie himself explicitly remarks),
and one obtains the same quantitative predictions as quantum mechanics.
As a matter of fact, de Broglie predicted electron diffraction based on similar
considerations well before 1927 when the detailed theory was worked out.10
Now take the simple case of a plane wave travelling towards a screen with a
single slit. The particle has a uniform velocity perpendicular to the screen.
If the initial position of the particle corresponds to the position of the slit,
the particle will go through, otherwise it will not. We can imagine the screen
being coated with photographic emulsion, so that the particle will be detected
if and only if it does not pass through the slit. That is, in the case of a
negative result, we have a measurement of position that is both faithful and
apparently as non-invasive as can be.
Nevertheless, the subsequent dynamics of the particle is affected. Indeed, after
the particle has passed through the slit, the relevant pilot wave is no longer
the incident plane wave, but only the spatially narrow component that has
gone through the slit along with the particle. The rest of the wave has not
‘collapsed’, but has interacted with the screen, and is no longer relevant to
the subsequent motion of the particle (unless the different components are
later brought to reinterfere together). This spatially narrow wave function,
however, has large transverse momentum components, and the particle is
diffracted accordingly. We thus have a straightforward violation of non-
invasive measurability (as made precise by (11)), even though the theory
than position was worked out only by Bohm (1952). Note that Einstein’s (1953) published
objection to Bohm’s theory was precisely that even for macroscopic systems, it violates
faithful measurability in the case of momentum. We shall just need position measurements
in the following.
10For a fuller historical summary, see Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009, esp. Chap. 2).
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satisfies both realism and faithful measurability with respect to position.11
But now, the situation is quite analogous if we try to model the macroscopic
case considered by Leggett and Garg. We have a two-valued quantity Q that
always has a value. The assumption that measurements of Q are faithful
implies (10), and thus
ρ(Qii) = ρ(Qi) , (19)
i. e. at all times ti the distribution of values of Q is the same as that for an en-
semble of measurement results. If we now assume that the latter is correctly
given by quantum mechanics, we obtain that the single-time distributions
ρ(Qt) for the values of Q at t must be given by
ρ(Qt = ±1) = 〈ψ(t)|P±1|ψ(t)〉 , (20)
where P±1 are the eigenprojections of Q corresponding to the eigenvalues
±1. Since Q takes no other values, it tunnels discontinuously back and forth
between the two potential wells.
This can be easily modelled using a stochastic dynamics.12 Bell (1986) pro-
vides an explicit discussion of the most general Markovian dynamics for the
values of a discrete observable (or ‘beable’ in his terminology) obeying the
constraint (20), as follows.13
Any Markovian dynamics can be reconstructed from its infinitesimal transi-
tion probabilities, in this case
tji(t) := lim
ε→0
ρ(Qt+ε = j|Qt = i)
ε
. (21)
The classic results from the 1930s and 1940s needed to show this do not
cover the case in which the single-time probabilities have zeros, which hap-
pens periodically for (20) under the evolution (1); but Georgii and Tumulka
11The failure of non-invasive measurability in pilot-wave theory is also pointed out by
Kofler and Brukner (2013) and by Maroney and Timpson (in preparation).
12This is so whether or not one might think there is some further mechanism that
determines also the times of the macroscopic tunnellings (which shall be of no concern to
us).
13For a more detailed discussion, see e. g. Bacciagaluppi and Dickson (1999), Bub (1999,
Chap. 5), or Vink (1993). Note that under certain circumstances, one can then indeed
prove that ideal measurements of the beable are faithful; see the remarks in Bacciagaluppi
and Dickson (1999, Section 5.2) and references therein.
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(2005) have provided the required generalisations. The infinitesimal transi-
tion probabilities can in turn be constructed by solving the following master
equation
ρ˙j(t) =
∑
i
(
tji(t)ρi(t)− tij(t)ρj(t)
)
(22)
(which follows from the law of total probability). This is in fact a continuity
equation for the probability, if one identifies the probability current jji(t) as
jji(t) = tji(t)ρi(t)− tij(t)ρj(t) . (23)
If we insert into (23) the quantum mechanical probability current,
jji(t) = 2Im〈ψ(t)|PjHPi|ψ(t)〉 , (24)
we obtain a solution to (22), and we can explicitly construct the desired
infinitesimal transition probabilities, for instance as
tji(t) := max
{
0,
jji(t)
ρi(t)
}
. (25)
This is Bell’s choice, and it yields a very precise discrete Markovian analogue
of de Broglie and Bohm’s pilot-wave theory. Indeed, Vink (1993) has shown
that one recovers de Broglie–Bohm theory as the appropriate continuum limit
of such a theory, when the beable is a discretisation of position.
We thus see that the assumptions of macroscopic realism and faithful mea-
surability for the observable Q, together with the constraint that the values
of Q be distributed according to the usual Born probabilities, naturally leads
to a pilot-wave dynamics for Q. On the other hand, as we pointed out in
the example of de Broglie–Bohm theory, pilot-wave theories do not satisfy
non-invasive measurability: a measurement of the beable of the theory, even
a negative-result one, will quite generally change the effective pilot-wave
of the system, and thus affect its subsequent dynamics. This shows that,
even though Leggett and Garg’s arguments may establish the plausibility of
faithful measurability given macroscopic realism, their further assumption of
non-invasive measurability is unwarranted. Thus, even assuming macroscopic
realism, one need not expect the Leggett–Garg inequality to be violated.14
14In Section 5 we shall mention how in certain circumstances it is easy to calculate how
the subsequent dynamics of Q is affected, and thus to see explicitly how the invasivity of
the measurements explains the violation of the inequality.
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In the next two sections, we shall discuss how to think of such a violation. In
any case, however, the above shows that the violation of the inequality does
not provide a good argument against macroscopic realism as such.
4 Contextuality and signalling
Bell-type inequalities have been recognised as providing necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for the existence of joint distributions ever since the work
of Suppes and Zanotti (1981) and of Fine (1982), with ‘contextuality’ usu-
ally defined as the non-existence of such a joint distribution. This kind of
analysis, however, standardly presupposes that certain relevant pairs of ob-
servables have joint distributions, and the question is whether the set as a
whole has. Thus, in particular, for these pairs we have that the marginal
distribution for the results of one measurement does not depend on having
performed the other measurement. More generally, one requires that the
probabilities for the results of one measurement do not depend on the in-
puts of the other measurement (‘no-signalling’ or ‘marginal selectivity’, as
the condition is more generally known outside of the literature on quantum
mechanics).
Indeed, if for instance measuring A alongside with B, or measuring A on its
own, yield different probability distributions for A, then A does not actually
refer to the same random variable in the two contexts, and one ought to
distinguish two different random variables, say AB and A. No-signalling can
of course be enforced by assuming spacelike separation of the measurements
considered (or using the quantum mechanical no-signalling theorem), but
this strategy is clearly precluded when considering sequential measurements
as in the Leggett–Garg scenario.
In such cases, it is less obvious what a violation of the corresponding Bell
inequalities means, since we know already that the existence of joint proba-
bilities is precluded.15
This question has been recently taken up and given a beautiful treatment
15In particular, it follows that the presence of signalling already rules out the conjunction
of macroscopic realism and faithful and non-invasive measurement. This can also be seen
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by Dzhafarov and Kujala (2014a,b), who provide a principled criterion for
distinguishing contextuality from mere violation of marginal selectivity. For
the case of Leggett and Garg, they obtain, as the necessary and sufficient
criterion for such contexuality, the violation of a modified Suppes–Zanotti
inequality, namely
− 1− 2∆0 ≤ 〈Q
12
1 Q
12
2 〉+ 〈Q
23
2 Q
23
3 〉+ 〈Q
13
1 Q
13
3 〉 ≤
≤ 1 + 2∆0 + 2min{〈Q
12
1 Q
12
2 〉, 〈Q
23
2 Q
23
3 〉, 〈Q
13
1 Q
13
3 〉} , (26)
where
∆0 :=
1
2
(
|〈Q122 〉 − 〈Q
23
2 〉|+ |〈Q
13
3 〉 − 〈Q
23
3 〉|
)
(27)
is the measure for the violation of marginal selectivity (i.e. the measure for
signalling) obtained uniquely if one minimises the unobservable probabilities
ρ(Q121 −Q
13
1 ), ρ(Q
12
2 −Q
23
2 ), ρ(Q
13
3 −Q
23
3 ) (28)
under the constraint that the expectation values
〈Q121 〉, 〈Q
13
1 〉, 〈Q
12
2 〉, 〈Q
23
2 〉, 〈Q
13
3 〉, 〈Q
23
3 〉 (29)
are given.
Compared to (15), in order to evaluate (26) we also need to calculate ∆0,
but it is easy to show that for i < j,
〈Qijj 〉 = cos(
∆E
~
(tj − ti)) cos(
∆E
~
(ti − t0)) . (30)
Also, since for i > j we have 〈Qjij 〉 = 〈Q
j
j〉, and the latter is given by (2), we
have
〈Qjij 〉 = cos(
∆E
~
(tj − t0)) . (31)
directly, e.g. since
ρ(Qikk ) = ρ(Q
i
k) =
∑
Qi
i
=±1
ρ(Qik|Q
i
i)ρ(Q
i
i) =
∑
Qi=±1
ρ(Qk|Qi)ρ(Qi) = ρ(Qk) = ρ(Q
k
k) ,
thus ρ(Qikk ) = ρ(Q
k
k) for all k > i (and in fact for all k 6= i, if one assumes that earlier
transition probabilities are independent of whether one carries out a later measurement),
as discussed also by Maroney and Timpson (in preparation) and in detail by Kofler and
Brukner (2013).
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Thus,
∆0 =
1
2
(
| cos(∆E
~
(t2 − t1)) cos(
∆E
~
(t1 − t0))− cos(
∆E
~
(t2 − t0))|+
| cos(∆E
~
(t3−t1)) cos(
∆E
~
(t1−t0))−cos(
∆E
~
(t3−t2)) cos(
∆E
~
(t2−t0))|
)
.
(32)
Choosing again (17), which maximally violates the original Leggett–Garg
inequality, we obtain
∆0 =
1
2
(
| − 1
2
cos(η)− cos(η + 2pi
3
)|+ | − 1
2
cos(η) + 1
2
cos(η + 2pi
3
)|
)
, (33)
where we have set η := ∆E
~
(t1 − t0). The range of (33) is
3
8
≤ ∆0 ≤
3
4
(34)
(as can easily be seen numerically), so that the tightest lower bound of the
modified Leggett–Garg inequality (26) becomes −1.75, and the inequality is
always satified.
This is perhaps surprising, but even more surprising is the following.
As mentioned in Section 2, the product expectation value (3) is independent
of the initial state |ψ(0)〉 of the SQUID. Therefore, the amount by which
the Leggett–Garg inequality (15) is violated is also independent of |ψ(0)〉, or
even of whether the initial state is a pure state of the form (1) or an arbitrary
mixture of such states. By contrast, (30) and (31) do depend on the initial
state, and thus so does the term ∆0 that enters the modified Suppes–Zanotti
inequality (26). Therefore — unlike the case of the original Leggett–Garg
inequality — the amount by which the modified inequality may be violated
(and thus the amount of contextuality in the sense of Dzhafarov and Kujala)
depends in fact on the initial state of the SQUID.
Now take the case in which the initial state is an equal-weight mixture of
|ψR〉 and |ψL〉, i. e. the maximally mixed state. Obviously one has 〈Q
j
j〉 = 0
for all j, but it is also easy to check explicitly that 〈Qijj 〉 = 0 for all i < j.
Indeed, if the initial state is |ψR〉, we have
pR(Q
ij
j = 1) = cos
2(∆E
~
(tj − ti)) cos
2(∆E
~
ti) + sin
2(∆E
~
(tj − ti)) sin
2(∆E
~
ti) ,
(35)
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while if the initial state is |ψL〉, we have
pL(Q
ij
j = 1) = cos
2(∆E
~
(tj − ti)) sin
2(∆E
~
ti) + sin
2(∆E
~
(tj − ti)) cos
2(∆E
~
ti) .
(36)
Thus,
1
2
pR(Q
ij
j = 1) +
1
2
pL(Q
ij
j = 1) =
1
2
, (37)
and the probabilities if the state is intially maximally mixed are the same as
without the previous measurement at ti.
16 Consequently, we have ∆0 = 0,
i.e. there is no longer any violation of marginal selectivity, and the violation
of the original Leggett–Garg inequality implies also the violation of the mod-
ified Suppes–Zanotti inequality. In other words, in the case of the maximally
mixed state the previous situation is reversed: the temporal signalling dis-
appears, and the Dhzafarov–Kujala analysis of the violation of the original
Leggett–Garg inequality yields indeed a verdict of contextuality.17
16An alternative way of seeing this is to note that the sequential measurement of two
observables on a two-level system in the maximally mixed state can be realised by perform-
ing one measurement each on two entangled two-level systems in the singlet state. In this
case, it is obvious that the no-signalling condition is satisfied. This trick allows one to in-
tertranslate variously between ‘contextuality’ and ‘non-locality’ results (cf. Bacciagaluppi
2014, pp. 30–32 and fn 34).
17The following point was suggested to me by a remark by Acacio de Barros (which
I hope I have not misinterpreted). The Dhzafarov–Kujala analysis aims at analysing
the violation of some Bell inequality, e.g. (26), in the presence of direct influence of one
measurement on the distribution of results of a subsequent measurement. It then makes
sense to analyse separately the different scenarios in which one tests for such violations.
The above analysis implicitly assumed the scenario labelled (i) in footnote 3, in which one
measures the three expectation values 〈Qiji Q
ij
j 〉 separately, and thus with the same initial
state (whether pure or mixed) in all three experiments. If one tests for violation of (26)
using scenario (ii), then one may want to calculate ∆0 using the given (pure or mixed)
initial state to evaluate the terms 〈Q12
2
〉 and 〈Q13
3
〉 but using the maximally mixed state
(that results from the initial measurement in the context 123) to evaluate the terms 〈Q23
2
〉
and 〈Q233 〉, which then both equal 0. In the case of an initial pure state it then follows
that ∆0 =
1
2
| cos(η)|, which ranges between 0 and 1
2
, and whether (26) is violated or not
becomes dependent on the value of η, i.e. that of t0. It seems thus that although scenarios
(i) and (ii) are equivalent for the purpose of testing the original Leggett–Garg inequality
(15), they are inequivalent for the purpose of testing the modified inequality (26). This
point may require further analysis.
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5 An analogy, and Schro¨dinger’s SQUID
The analysis of the last section has left us with a somewhat puzzling situa-
tion: the violation of the Leggett–Garg inequality — which is independent
of the initial state of the SQUID — can be absorbed entirely into the vio-
lation of marginal selectivity (i.e. into the amount of temporal signalling),
or interpreted entirely in terms of contextuality, depending on whether the
initial state of the SQUID is pure or is the maximally mixed state.
This situation, however, has a well-understood analogue in pilot-wave the-
ory, which we shall describe in this final section. In pilot-wave theory, the
violation of the Bell inequalities in an EPR scenario is explained as an ef-
fect of the non-local dynamics. For each EPR pair, the details of how the
measurement on one side is carried out will determine the trajectory of the
particle on the other side, and this non-locality of the dynamics enforces the
correlations necessary for the violation of the Bell inequalities. It also allows
for the possibility of signalling, if one imagines the initial particle positions
as given.18 However, if the initial positions are unknown (more precisely if
one assumes the positions are distributed according to the usual quantum
mechanical measure), then the possibility of signalling is washed out.
To make the analogy clearer, let us spell out the sense in which results of
measurements in pilot-wave theory are determined by the context of mea-
surement.19
(a) Local contextuality: the result of a spin measurement on Alice’s side of
the EPR set-up is in general jointly determined by the position of the particle
on her side before her measurement and by the details of the experimental
18This is just the very well-known fact that as a hidden variables theory pilot-wave theory
exhibits parameter dependence, i.e. probabilistic dependence of the distant outcome in an
EPR experiment on the parameters of the nearby measurement, and in this way can be
used in principle (i.e. if one could know the hidden variables) to signal across an EPR
set-up. See Jarrett (1984) and Shimony (1986) for the (closely related but not identical)
classic analyses of non-locality along these lines.
19One needs to distinguish this notion of measurement contextuality from the probabilis-
tic notion of contextuality of the last section. Indeed, as we have seen, the measurement
contextuality of pilot-wave theory is related to the possibility of signalling, while according
to Dhzafarov and Kujala probabilistic contextuality is defined over and above the amount
of signalling present.
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arrangement on her side. (The same is true on Bob’s side.)20
(b) Non-local contextuality: if before Alice’s measurement Bob has per-
formed a measurement of spin, then in general the result of Alice’s measure-
ment depends also on the position of Bob’s particle and the experimental
details on his side. In the special case in which Alice measures spin in the
same direction as Bob, then not only do the initial position of the electron
on Bob’s side and the details of his experimental arrangement jointly deter-
mine his own measurement result, but the non-locality of the dynamics now
forces the electron on Alice’s side to exhibit the opposite spin, regardless of
its initial position and of the details of Alice’s experimental arrangement.
Now assume an ensemble in which the initial positions of the two electrons are
given (‘pure hidden state’). Then, in general, the final position distribution
for Alice’s electron will depend on whether or not Bob has performed the
measurement on his side, i.e. we have a violation of marginal selectivity.
Assume instead that we have an appropriately mixed hidden state, specifi-
cally the usual quantum distribution of initial positions. If the initial position
distribution is the usual quantum mechanical one, then so is the final position
distribution, but that means the detections on Alice’s screen are distributed
just as quantum mechanics predicts. And we know from the no-signalling
theorem that it makes no difference to this distribution whether or not Bob
has performed a previous measurement on his side. Thus, if we assume an
appropriately mixed hidden state, marginal selectivity is restored: the ‘noise’
induced by the distribution of positions on Bob’s side obliterates the ‘signal’
he could in principle send by choosing to perform his measurement.
We can make the analogy even closer by dispensing with the EPR scenario,
and looking instead at a Bell-type pilot-wave model of the Leggett–Garg
scenario as in Section 3, with Q as beable. In this case,21 one can show
that at least under certain circumstances the probabilities for the values of
the beable Q conditional on the initial values Q = ±1 are the same as the
quantum mechanical probabilities for Q conditional on the initial state being
|ψR〉 or |ψL〉, for which we have seen in Section 4 that we have signalling
20In the EPR–Bohm spin scenario, the relevant details are the polarity and gradient of
the magnetic field. For a clear and accessible discussion, see e.g. Barrett (1999, Section 5.2).
21Using the techniques described in Bacciagaluppi and Dickson (1999, Section 5.2) and
references therein.
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in excess of the violation of the Leggett–Garg inequality. Thus, assuming
a beable theory as in Section 3, even though there is no signalling if the
quantum state is maximally mixed, we have signalling in principle if the
beables are known.22
Returning to the purely quantum mechanical case, we can now say the fol-
lowing. If the initial state is either definitely the pure state |ψR〉 or definitely
the pure state |ψL〉, then we can affect the distribution of Q at tj by per-
forming a measurement of Q at an earlier time ti. If the initial state is an
equal weight mixture of the two states, and we only know with probability
1
2
that we have |ψR〉 or |ψL〉, then our performing a measurement at ti will
produce one half of the time the distribution for Q at tj given by (35), and
the other half of the time the distribution given by (36), without us being
able to control which. But as we have seen, the resulting averaged distribu-
tion (37) is the uniform distribution, which is exactly the same as predicted
by the initial equal-weight mixture for the case in which we do not perform
any measurement. Thus, marginal selectivity is restored on average.
This, however, cannot be the full explanation of the violation of the Leggett–
Garg inequality, because in quantum mechanics a mixed state need not be
ignorance-interpretable. We could entangle the SQUID with a microscopic
probe, e.g. as described by Leggett and Garg themselves (1985, p. 859), so
that there is indeed no matter of fact whether it is in the state |ψR〉 or
|ψL〉. Or one could imagine a sealed box with an atom with half-life of one
hour and a mechanism that prepares the SQUID in the state |ψR〉 or |ψL〉
depending on whether at the end of the hour the atom has decayed or not.
In the case of such ‘Schro¨dinger SQUIDs’, it thus seems there is no way out
of interpreting the violation of the Leggett–Garg inequality as an indication
of genuine contextuality.
22Note the (at least partial) analogy to how in standard pilot-wave theory the violation
of the Bell inequality in the EPR case is explained through the possibility of signalling in
principle, although at the quantum level there is no signalling. It will be interesting to
explore the analogy further, making explicit the parallels between the Dzhafarov–Kulaja
analysis of contextuality and the Jarrett–Shimony analysis of non-locality.
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